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NOTE AND COMMENT. STATE REGULATIONS AFrECTING INTERSTATE CoMIN, RcE-The line between

regulations of intrastate and interstate commerce is difficult to draw and
hard.to maintain. This is well illustrated in the recent case of St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company v. Arkansas. decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States April 4, igo, Advance Sheets, May I, 1.910, p. 476, 30

Sup..Ct. 476.
This was an action by the prosecuting attorney against the railway company to recover penalties for alleged violation of the rules of the railroad
commission of Arkansas and certain statutory provisions, making it the duty
of railroad companies to furnish shippers with cars upon proper demand,
and subjecting them to a penalty for failure.
One Reinsch had made written demand of the company for cars to ship
hay between places in the state from October 30, 19o5 to January zo, i9o6.
and was furnished 5I less than he demanded.

He complained to the railroad

commission who' found the company had violated the rule and the statute
and directed the prosecuting attorney to sue for the penalty. The company
aefended on the ground that it was engaged in interstate shipments of freight
over its lines in Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana and Missouri, and by connect-
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ing lines throughout the United States; that its equipment was ample for its
freight traffic both state and interstate; that in anticipation of greater demand it had made an effort to buy ,ooo more cars but had been unable to
get them,'and had therefore begun to construct shops of its own to build
its cars; that at the time of the alleged default there was an extraordinary
demand for cars for both interstate and local traffic upon its own and con-

necting lines; that it had equally distributed its cars to shippers along its

line giving no preference to interstate over local shippers; and that "it would
have been impossible to comply with the rule -without discrimination against
its interstate commerce shippers, and therefore obedience to the rule would
have resulted in a direct burden upon interstate commerce," and the rule
and statute were therefore in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States conferring power to regulate commerce among the states upon Congress. This defense was insisted upon in various ways but overruled by the
trial court, and a verdict of $1,350, with judgment thereon was rendered
against the company. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state,
85 Ark. 311, 107 S. W. 118o, 122 Am. St. Rep. 33.
The facts as stated in the opinion of the State Supreme Court were that
own line;
70 per cent of the freight traffic of the road originated on its
that it had 9517 freight cars; 3982.of these were in daily use upon its own
line, and 5525 off its line, while only 2519 foreign cars were upon its line,
with a daily balance of exchange of 1473 cars, and a daily shortage of about
65o cars; that the number of cars owned was larger than the average freight
carrying road had, and sufficient to meet the demands of its own traffic, if its
cars could be kept at home; and that "its failure to furnish cars was wholly
due to an inability to regain its cars which were sent to other roads carrying
freight from its own line." Also that the company was a member of the
American Railway Association (as were go per cent of the railways of the
United States) which makes rules for the interchange of cars; that such
association is lawful, and a system of interchange of loaded cars, instead of
reloading and reshipping, is essential to the public convenience and conforms
to the policy of both Federal and state legislation, and that "for one railroad
company to be an Ishmaelite among its associates would operate disastrously
to its shippers"; but fuither that the rules made by the railway association
for the return of cars,-a charge of 25 to 5o cents per day per car,-were
totally inadequate to sedure their prompt return in case of congested traffic,
and that prior to i9o5 the company had lost control of its cars, knowing that
the rules of the association were insufficient to secure their return within a
reasonable time.
The State Supreme Court therefore by HILL, C. J.,ruled, that although
it may be better for the company "to suffer these ills than to sail under a
black flag and refuse to send its cars beyond its lines," yet until it "shows
reasonable rules and regulations for the interchange of cars, it cannot avail
itself of these rules of interchange as causing and excusing its default to
the public, for the rules here shown have proved unreasonable and inefficient
before this default occurred."
Mr. Justice WHIrE in .reversing. the decision of the state court says: The
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company "was powerless, of its own motion, to change the rules thus generally- prevailing, and therefore was necessarily either compelled to desist
from the interchange of cars with connecting carriers for the purpose of the
movement of interstate commerce, or to conduct such business with the
certainty of being subjected to the penalties which the state statute provided
for.*** It needs but statement to demonstrate that the ruling of the
court below involved necessarily the assertion of power in the state to absolutely forbid the efficacious carrying on of interstate commerce, or, what is
equivalent thereto, to cause the right to efficiently conduct such commerce
to depend upon the willingness of the company to be subjected to enormous
pecuniary penalties as a condition' of the exercise of the right. ***
If the
rules of the railway association governing go per cent of the railroads and
a vast proportion of ihe interstate commerce of the country are inefficient
to secure just dealing as to cars moved by the carriers engaged in interstate
commerce, that fact affords no ground for conceding that such subject was
within the final cognizance of the court below, and could by it be made the
basis of prohibiting interstate ommerce or unlawfully burdening the right
to carry it on. In the nature or things, as the rules and regulations- of the
association concern matters of interstate commerce inherently within Federal control, the power to determine their sufficiency, we think was primarily
vested in the body upon whom Congress has conferred authority in that
regard." Chief Justice FuLLR dissents.
Mr. Justice WHITZ cites no authority for his ruling, -and no reliance is
placed upon tl - rule that the subject has been regulated by Federal legislation, or by any rule of the Interstate Commerce Commission, -nor upon therule that, because Congress has not acted upon the matter, it is to be assumed that the subject is to be left free and untrammeled by any state regulations. Neither is there any finding of facts as to the proportion of interstate and intrastate traffic,-only that 70 per cent of the traffic originates on
its line, and 3o per cen off, but how much of either is interstate traffic is
niot stated. The lower court ruled that the statute only imposed a penalty
for negligently failing to perform the common law duty to furnish cars
promptly upon demand, whether for state or interstate shipments, and the
known inadequacy of the association rules to enable the company to comply with this duty was negligence. The association rules for return of cars
necessarily directly affected both state and interstate shipments. If they
were -inadequate, and had been known to be so generally, does the supreme.
court mean to hold that conformity to them would, not be negligent, just
because go per cent of the roads are parties to them?
In Missouri P. R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co. (I9o9), 211 U. S. 612,
29 Sup. Ct. 214, Mr. Justice BaxWR says; "The roads are engaged in both
interstate commerce and that within the state. In the former, they are subject to the regulation of Congress; in the latter, to that of the state; and to
enforce the proper relation between Congress and the state, the full control
of each over the commerce subject to its dominion must be preserved," and
Mr: Justice MOODY, dissenting, says: "The commerce clause vests- the power to
regulate interstate commerce exclusively in the Congress, and leaves the power
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to regulate intrastate commerce exclusively in the states. Both powers being
exclusive, neither can be directly exercised except by the government in which
it is vested." If these statements are correct, and the same regulation had
been made by Congress or the Interstate Commerce Commission as to an
interstate shipment, and the company had pleaded that it would have been
impossible to comply without discrimination against its state traffic, because
its cars were negligently allowed to be away from home so that it could not
adequately supply either its interstate or state shippers, would the Federal
regulation have been held unconstitutional, as beyond the Federal power, because directly affecting state commerce, or would the company have been, held
liable because of its negligence, when the only case before the court was one
of interstate commerce, and not state commerce? Or to put the matter in
another way, is it possible that where a railway association rnoakes ineffective
rules relating to the return of cars to one of its members, which knows they
are notoriously inadequate, and shippers, therefore cannot get cars promptly,
the state can not impose a penalty for not furnishing the cars to a state
shipper, because that would directly affect interstate commerce, and the Federal government cannot impose a penalty for not furnishing cars to an interstate shipper, because that would directly affect state traffic? Such certainly
cannot be the rule.
In Houston and T. C. R. Co. v. Mayes (i9o6), 201 U. S. 321, 26 Sup. Ct.
491, ilaintiff sued to recover a penalty for failing to furnish him cars for
an interstate shipment, contrary to a statutory provision penalizing the company for its failure to furnish cars within a specified time aftei demand, and
making the duty an absolute one, admitting of no excuse whatever. This
was held,-Mr. Justice BROWN, delivering the opinion (Chief Justice FULLER,
Mr. Justice HARLAN, and Mr. Justice MCKENNA, dissenting) "as applied to
interstate commerce," to be unconstitutional. In McNeil v. Southern. R.
Co. (igo6), 2o2 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. 722, a state railway commission ordered cars containing interstate shipments to be delivered beyond its right
of way to a private siding. The suit was to enjoin the collection of the
statutory penalties for violating the orders of the commission. This order
the court by Mr. Justice WHITE, held to be an unlawful interference with
interstate commerce, whether considered as a general power to regulate carriers engaged in interstate commerce, or .to make an order in a particular
case.
On the other hand in the Larabee case supra the plaintiff brought man'damus to compel the railroad company to resume the transfer of cars loaded
and unloaded from the line of a connecting carrier to his flour mill upon
-payment of the customary charges. Three-fifths of plaintiff's shipments
were interstate, the. defendant was a member of a car service association
which regulated the interchange of cars; plaintiff refused to pay a demurrage charge on certain cars furnished by the defendant, because the delay was
caused by it instead of by the plaintiff; the car service association demanded
payment, and upon refusal directed the defendant to discontinue furnishing
cars to plaintiff as before; it was found that the delay for which the demurrage charge was made was due to the fault of the company. There was
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no state regulation involved,-only common law duties.' The defendant
claimed that it was subject to the control of Congress only, since the shipments were partly or mostly interstate. The court, by Mr. Justice BREWER
(MOODY and WHITE, dissenting) held that the state court could enforce the
common law duty not to discriminate between shippers in such a case,-"at
least until Congress or the Interstate Commerce Commission takes action,
although both carriers are engaged in interstate conmmerce, and three-fifths
of the output of the mill is shipped out of the state," and the mere delegation
by Congress to the Interstate Commerce Commission of power over interstate
commerce" is not equivalent to specific action by Congress in respect to the
matter involved which prevents a state from making regulations conducive to
the welfare and convenience of its citizens that may indirectly affect commerce." This case reviews the cases upholding state regulations. Compare
also Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Macursky (igo), 216 U. S. 122, 30 Sup. Ct. 378.
In Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (igo6), 203
U. S. 335, 27 Sup. Ct. go, after reviewing the cases the court by Mr. Justice
PECKHAM, says:
"A state railroad commission, under a state statute, may
order the stoppage of trains if the company does not otherwise furnish
proper and adequate accommodation to a particular locality, and in such cases
the order may embrace a through i!pterstate train actually running, and compel it to stop at the locality named. In such case. in the absence of Congressional legislation covering the subject, there is no illegal or improper
interference with the interstate commerce right"; but if reasonable accommodation is otherwise furnished, a regulation requiring interstate- trains to
stop would be void. See also Missouri P..R. Co. v. Kans. (1910), 216 L. S.
262, 3o Sup. Ct. 330.
In view of these decisions, it seems that the-case under review ought to
have passed upon the point of the negligence 'of the company, rather than
held the statute (which made no absolute requirement as the state court
held to furnish cars at all events, without reference to its effect upon interstate commerce) to be an unconstitutional and direct interference with interstate commerce. It seems fair under all the facts of the case to hold. contrary to what the lower court held, that the railroad company, considering
its duties to both its state and interstate shippers was not negligent, and
therefore not liable for any damages or penalty; and because the question
of negligence in such cases of apportioning cars necessarily involves the relative duties to state and interstate shippers, and therefore raises a question
under the federal law, the federal courts would have jurisdiction to determine
whether there had been negligence or not, and if such court found there was
negligence in the performance of the common law duty to- a state shipper,
then should not the state law imposing the penalty be upheld ?
H. L. W.
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